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INTRODUCTION
Jessie is a young, middle class mother who wants a divorce from her
husband, Ron. Ron will most likely request help from his friend Dave, a
divorce attorney with a reputation as a real 'fighter. " Jessie, on the other
hand, wants an attorney who is sensitive to her vulnerable state, who will
return her phone calls promptly, and who has evening office hours, as she
knows she will have to pick up a part-time job. She also wants someone
who is competent, although she is not quite sure what that really means,
having never had experience with divorce attorneys before. She has men-
tioned her plight to a few close friends who have told her they will "ask
around," but Jessie feels she should start looking herself.
Where should she begin? She could look up "attorneys" in the Yellow
Pages or study the ads in TV Guide, but are these attorneys competent?
Calling the local bar association for a list of attorneys' names seems even
more limiting, without further description of their practices other than
'family law attorney. " How will she know without visiting with each
attorney which one will best satisfy her needs? What if any of them have
committed malpractice or have had complaints filed against them? Is there
any way of finding out? The hurdles to obtaining an attorney competent
and compassionate enough to handle a divorce seem almost as daunting as
the divorce itself
Jessie's plight in not knowing where to turn for legal assistance
compatible with her needs is common. In a national survey spon-
sored by the American Bar Association and American Bar Foun-
dation in 1974, eighty-three percent of the public polled agreed
with the statement, "A lot of people do not go to lawyers because
they have no way of knowing which lawyer is competent to handle
their particular problem."' The ABA initiated a follow-up survey
in 1985 that produced nearly identical results to the same ques-
tion posed a decade earlier.2 The lay public is too often forced to
rely upon the anachronistic "word-of-mouth" method in choos-
I BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 228-29 (1977); see Lori B. Andrews, Lawyer
Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 967, 1009
n. 197 (citing additional surveys in support of Curran survey).
2 ABA COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, LEGAL ADVERTISING: THE ILLINOIS
EXPERIMENT 12 (1985). In this survey, 598 respondents were polled in
shopping malls in 4 major cities across the United States.
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ing an attorney.' The problem is worse for those of lower income
levels and socio-economic classes, who use attorneys less fre-
quently and thus have less access to word-of-mouth sources.4
The rapid growth of the legal profession will only increase the
public's need for truthful information concerning lawyers.5
This Article criticizes the inadequacy of information available
to consumers6 seeking an attorney compatible with their needs,
analyzes why- such inadequacy exists, and proposes solutions.
The central thesis is that the legal profession views the issue of
dispensing information consumers need through the wrong
lens-that of attorney, rather than consumer. As a result, the
issue is framed narrowly in terms of regulating the rights of attor-
neys, rather than broadly in terms of disclosing to the public
information it wishes to know. To ensure their self-regulation,
lawyers have developed contorted and varying rules that attempt
to define what information attorneys can release through the
advertising media under the paternalistic7 guise of protecting the
consumer from false and misleading information. With respect to
s This method of transmitting information has been termed anachronistic
by both the Supreme Court and the Bar, who state that the legal and lay
communities are too isolated from each other for informal sources of
information such as word-of-mouth to be effective. See Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374 n.30 (1977); Andrews, supra note 1, at 992; see also
Elliot E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the
Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 440 (1965),
cited in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1980).
4 Donna K. Darden et al., The Marketing of Legal Services, J. MARKETING,
Spring 1981, at 123, 127-29 (setting forth findings indicating that the
public's usage of lawyers increases with income, occupational prestige, and
social class).
5 Sara Murray, Comment, The Whole Truth or Nothing but the Truth? Should
Attorneys Who Advertise be Required to Disclose Prior Disciplinary Actions Taken
Against Them?, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 953, 968-69 n.64 (1990).
6 In this Article, I limit the term "consumers" to middle and lower
income persons who are in an economic bracket that enables them to
choose their own attorney, but who, unlike the corporate client or upper-
level income client, do not have the knowledge or sophistication to enable
them to discern quality representation.
7 For criticism of the profession's paternalistic attitude, see, e.g., LORI B.
ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLIcrrATION
81-82 (1980) andJETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 98 (1978), cited
in William B. Fecher, Casenote, Professional Responsibility: The United States
Supreme Court Gives Attorney Advertising Increased Protection-Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985), 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 455,
479 (1986).
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attorney referral services and records of malpractice, the legal
profession has been even more restrictive in releasing informa-
tion to the public. Yet, in striving to maintain their autonomy,
lawyers have only perpetuated the enormous gap between the
information consumers would like to have concerning attorneys
and that which they receive.8
Part I of this Article describes the types of attorney information
consumers would find helpful and explains why they should have
this information. Part II explores four sources of information
they presently receive-(1) advertising, (2) attorney directories,
(3) bar referral services, and (4) malpractice listings9-and
explains why these sources are inadequate in supplying desired
information to the public. Part III discusses why the legal profes-
sion withholds more information than it should from consumers.
This part focuses on the regulatory nature of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence and the anachronistic attitudes of state
bars. Finally, Part IV offers proposals for changing the way the
legal profession looks at consumers' need for information and,
ultimately, the way lawyers perceive themselves.
Essentially, to resolve the predicament in which legal institu-
tions have placed consumers such as Jessie, the problem must be
viewed as a consumer issue, not a legal issue. Unless the con-
sumer is involved throughout the process of regulating informa-
tion released, attorneys will be more inclined to protect their
profession from interference by outsiders than to give the public
access to information it needs. The public must be better edu-
cated regarding the practices of the legal profession, and lawyers
must be better educated regarding the needs of the public. Nega-
tive and confusing legal standards currently imposed to restrict
information should be replaced by guidelines developed and eval-
uated by consumers. Until lawyers relinquish their current lens
and, with it, their need to maintain their autonomy by controlling
8 Robert F. Dyer & Terence A. Shimp, The Discrepancy Between Consumers'
Information Needs and Information Content in Lawyers'Newspapers Ads, 1979 PRoc.
AM. ACAD. ADVERTISING 1 (survey of Maryland attorneys and consumers
indicating that lawyers' advertisements fail to provide consumers with
information they regard as important in selecting an attorney).
9 This Article focuses on the profession's regulation of the content of
information on attorneys, rather than on the format or medium used to
dispense it. Therefore, I do not address issues about the propriety of
personal solicitation, direct-mail solicitation, or television advertisement.
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the information dispensed, consumers of legal services will con-
tinue to be denied access to information they deserve.
I. WHAT CONSUMERS WANT AND WHY THEY SHOULD GET IT
Consumers have consistently expressed a need for more infor-
mation with which to select an attorney.' 0 Unfortunately, a
marked disparity exists between the type of information consum-
ers want and the type the legal profession thinks they should
have. The gap between the public's needs and the legal profes-
sion's compliance with those needs only frustrates the public and
exacerbates its distrust of lawyers." Closing that gap by provid-
ing more information would benefit both the public and the legal
profession.
A. What Consumers Want
A survey of 233 consumers conducted in 1980 by Marketing
Professor Robert Smith and Law Professor Tiffany Meyer con-
firms that, in choosing a lawyer, the public is primarily concerned
with the integrity of the lawyer and the quality of the lawyer's
services.12 Yet, only twenty percent of the respondents actually
used the factors of "integrity" and "quality of service" in choos-
ing a lawyer. In contrast, 91.9% used the factors of "personal
acquaintance" or "recommendation by a friend" to choose their
1o See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
11 The Curran survey indicates that 39% of the public polled believe that
lawyers will take a case despite their not feeling sure they know enough
about the relevant law to handle the case well. See CURRAN, supra note 1, at
229. The public's lack of trust in lawyers is also supported by the results of
a 1983 Gallup poll in which only one out of three persons polled rated
lawyers as "highly trustworthy." See ABA COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, supra
note 2, at 1.
12 Robert E. Smith & Tiffany S. Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A Consumer
Perspective, J. MARKETING, Spring 1980, at 56, 60. In their survey, Smith and
Meyer gave consumers a choice of 18 factors to rank in order of importance
in choosing an attorney. The 18 factors, ranked in order of importance by
consumers, were "Integrity of lawyer, Quality of service, Promptness of
service, Area of lawyer specialty, Past experience of lawyer, Cost of legal
service, Past representation by lawyer, Recommendation by other lawyer,
Recommendation by friend, Convenience of office hours, Years in practice,
Personal acquaintance, Referral by state/county bar, Law school attended,
Referral by legal aid, Location of office, Listing in yellow pages, Other." Id.
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attorney.' 3 Professors Smith and Meyer conclude that the dispar-
ity between criteria consumers say are important and those they
actually use shows that consumers would use criteria pertaining
to quality and integrity if such information were more available. 4
Unfortunately, the legal profession refuses to release certain
information the public needs to judge an attorney's integrity or
quality of service.
What information might a consumer like to know to judge
integrity or quality? To judge a lawyer's "integrity," defined by
one dictionary as "the quality or state of being of sound moral
principle; uprightness, honesty, and sincerity,"' 5 a consumer
might like to know the lawyer's reputation in the community,
including whether any other clients have complained about the
lawyer, whether the lawyer has any malpractice claims pending or
adjudicated, and whether the lawyer has any substance abuse
problems.
The term "quality" is more elusive than "integrity" because it
depends, in part, upon the needs of the individual consumer.' 6
While one consumer may think that a lawyer's "quality" depends
upon where the lawyer graduated from law school and whether or
not the lawyer made law review, another may view "quality" as
the lawyer's ability to interact with others on a humane and com-
passionate level. 17 One consumer may want a lawyer who has
spent years practicing in a specific area of law, while another may
prefer a lawyer who has a smaller client base and less experience,
but who answers the telephone more readily and has flexible
office hours.'" Other factors that may or may not impress mem-
is Id. at 60. Ironically, consumers ranked these latter two factors 9th and
12th in terms of importance.
14 Id. at 61. The flaw in Smith and Meyer's criteria is that a
recommendation could be based on "integrity" or "quality of service."
Nonetheless, the basis for such recommendation is still personal experience
with an attorney, rather than information released by the profession prior to
representation.
15 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE,
COLLEGE EDrION 759 (1960).
16 Smith & Meyer, supra note 12, at 61-62.
17 Consumers polled in an Oklahoma survey ranked "Friendly and
personable qualities" second in importance in their choice of attorney. See
ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 45, 46 (Table 11).
18 See Dyer & Shimp, supra note 8, at 2. Consumers in the Dyer and
Shimp survey ranked "Attorney Availability" first of eight criteria used to
evaluate lawyers.
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bers of the public seeking an attorney's services are the attorney's
record of wins and losses, the ability to advocate and willingness
to negotiate, price and flexibility of payment options, promptness
in initiating action on a claim,' 9 availability for trial, or even free
parking.20
Sources such as advertising, attorney directories, referral serv-
ices, and lists of attorneys sanctioned for misconduct could pro-
vide this information regarding integrity and quality of attorneys
to the public. However, as Part II demonstrates, they fail to do
so.
B. Why Consumers Should Get What They Want
The legal profession should provide constfmers with informa-
tion they want primarily because it is the duty of lawyers to serve
the public in the administration of justice. 2' As consumers of
legal services, the public deserves to have its needs recognized
and complied with. But, in addition to the public's deserving
attorney information, other reasons support the disclosure of
more information to consumers. First, lower income consumers
19 In fact, 59% of those polled in the Curran survey indicated that they
believed lawyers were generally not prompt. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 229.
20 In Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 481 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (N.D. Ala.
1979), rev'd in part, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981), the Alabama State Bar had
initiated a disciplinary action against two attorneys in part because the Bar
claimed that the attorneys' advertisement of free parking to potential clients
violated the rule against offering valuable consideration for legal business.
An informal survey of 46 California residents confirms many of the above
assertions. In response to the question, "What information would you like
to know about an attorney before you made your decision to retain one?"
28% responded that the attorney's reputation would be most significant. Of
those polled, 22% cited cost as a critical factor in hiring an attorney. In
addition, hidden fees, trial duration, and steep hourly rates were all areas of
concern. Approximately 15% of the respondents felt communication
regarding procedures, costs, and the status of their case would be highly
significant. Respondents stated that the legal profession involved too much
paperwork and that attorneys tended to procrastinate. Many of those polled
felt intimidated and nervous about asking questions of their attorney.
About 11% wanted to know an attorney's win/loss record regarding their
type of case. One respondent suggested that a public facility profiling
attorneys' education, years in practice, size of firm, and win/loss record be
made available. Survey by Cynthia Gentile, Research Assistant, in San
Diego (Oct. 1990).
21 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990) ("A lawyer
should strive to . . . exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public
service.").
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will have greater access to attorneys' services. Second, the quality
of attorneys' services will improve while the costs will decrease.
Third, the image of the legal profession will improve. Fourth, the
profession's fears that the public will be misled by claims as to
quality are groundless. Finally, the information that is currently
dispensed is inadequate to meet the public's needs.
1. Lower Income Consumers Will Have Greater Access to
Attorneys' Services
A study by Professors Donna Darden, William Darden, and
G.E. Kizer indicates that poor people do not use lawyers as much
as they should.22 The public's use of lawyers increases with
income, occupational prestige, and social class.23 One way to
reach poorer people is through the advertising of legal services.
According to the same study, nonusers of legal services find com-
mercial and organized sources of information more important
than users.24 Thus, permitting attorneys who serve lower income
levels to advertise information concerning the quality of their
services, particularly such factors as cost, availability, and free
parking, will improve access by those most in need of legal
services.
Opponents to attorney advertising claim that it will encourage
frivolous claims.25 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, however, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed this claim, noting the fail-
ure of the legal profession to adequately serve " 'the middle 70%
of our population.' "26 As the Court eloquently stated,
"Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial
machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for
a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal
action." 27
2. The Quality of Attorneys' Services Will Improve While
the Costs Will Decrease
The quality of attorneys' services improves when consumers
take a more active role in the selection of their legal service prov-
22 See Darden et al., supra note 4, at 127, 130.
23 Id. at 127-28.
24 Id. at 128-29.
25 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375-76 & n.31 (1977).
26 Id. at 376 (quoting ABA, REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES 2 (1972)).
27 Id.
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iders.2" A study by Douglas Rosenthal offers empirical data in
support of this argument.29 Professor Rosenthal concludes that
the more actively involved clients are in the litigation process, the
more likely they are to achieve good results in their cases."0
Not only will the quality of services improve, but clients will be
more satisfied. A 1986 study by Consumer Science Professor
Howard Schutz and Debra Judge concludes that consumers who
take a more active role in the selection of professional service
providers, including lawyers, experience a higher degree of ser-
vice satisfaction. 3 ' Disclosing more information to consumers
regarding the quality and integrity of attorneys will enable them
to take a more active role in selecting an attorney suitable to their
needs.
Disclosing more information to consumers will also decrease
the cost of lawyers' services. With more information, consumers
will have more choice of available attorneys, thus increasing com-
petition among attorneys and lowering prices.3 2 Economic theo-
rists Terry Calvani, James Langenfeld, and Gordon Shuford
explain that lifting restraints on lawyer advertising will enable
28 For a more in-depth, theoretical discussion of this concept, see Robert
F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control:
Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and
Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819, 833-35 (1990).
29 See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
(1974).
30 See id. at 30, 43-46. The results are the conclusions by 3 experienced
negligence attorneys and 2 claims adjusters who evaluated 60 personal
injury plaintiffs. Although Rosenthal speaks of client involvement in terms
of clients who follow their cases' progress, aid their lawyer in- obtaining
evidence, and rely on their attorney for emotional support when necessary,
certainly a client's ability to make an educated choice among attorneys
comprises part of the "involvement" to which Rosenthal refers.
This conclusion is also supported by the Curran survey, in which 50% of
clients interviewed felt that their attorneys did not keep them well enough
apprised of their cases. Thirty-six percent of the respondents felt that
lawyers are not concerned whether their clients understand what needs to
be done in their case and why. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 230.
31 Howard G. Schutz et al., Lawyers' Perceptions of Consumers' Attitudes:
Satisfaction, Quality, and Selection Criteria, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 87, 89 (1987)
(citing Howard G. Schutz & Debra S. Judge, Consumer Satisfaction with
Physicians, 1986 PROC., ADVANCES HEALTH CARE RES. CONF., AM. ASS'N FOR
ADVANCES HEALTH CARE RES., 49-51).
32 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the value of a
competitive environment in offering consumers more choice in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) and in Virginia State Board
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new firms to compete more readily with established firms."3 The
increase in client volume will also enable lawyers to lower their
fees.3 4 In fact, a 1978 study by Professor Steven Cox has already
shown that, on average, attorneys who advertise charge less than
attorneys who do not.3 5 Furthermore, a subsequent study
designed by Cox for the Federal Trade Commission found that,
on average, attorneys in more restrictive advertising states charge
more than those in less restrictive states.3 6
3. The Image of the Legal Profession Will Improve
Increasing the information made available to consumers on
lawyers' integrity and quality of service will enhance the profes-
sion's image by improving professional ethics and public trust in
attorneys. Disclosing to the public information on attorneys who
have disciplinary actions pending against them may, in the short
run, tarnish the profession's reputation. In the long run, how-
ever, the threat of disclosure will encourage attorneys to be more
ethical. Supplying clients with more information to judge an
attorney's qualifications may also help erode the reluctance of
attorneys3 7 and judges38 to publicize misconduct and ensure
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1975).
For an excellent economic analysis of the benefits of advertising, see
generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1088-89
(1983).
33 Terry Calvani et al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41
VAND. L. REV. 761, 776-78 (1988).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 783 (citing Phoenix Pilot Study discussed in Steven R. Cox et al.,
Consumer Information and the Pricing of Legal Services, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 305
(1982)).
36 Id. at 783-84 (citing FTC study discussed in CLEVELAND REGIONAL
OFFICE & BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, REPORT OF THE STAFF TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL
SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL
ADVERTISING 79 (1984) [hereafter FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT]).
37 Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the
Competence of Lawyers?, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1223 & n.97 (1988)
("Experience has shown, however, that only a small percentage-ten to
fifteen percent--of complaints to disciplinary authorities are filed by
lawyers.") (citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 683 n.18
(1986)).
38 See Lois G. Forer, When Should Judges Be Whistle Blowers? Ethical
Obligations of the Judiciary to the Public, JUDGES J., Summer 1988, at 5, 6.
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prompt discipline. 9 If the profession is to remain self-policing,
better that its own members note instances of legal malfeasance
before the consumers do.
Releasing more information about the quality of legal services
will help dispel the public's current distrust of the legal system4 °
and encourage people to use it more often to resolve disputes.
As the Bates Court recognized, "[T]he failure of lawyers to adver-
tise creates public disillusionment with the profession. The
absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's fail-
ure to reach out and serve the community .... ,'41 Thus, in dis-
pensing more information, the profession will appear to care
more about serving the community by ensuring that the public's
needs are met.
4. Fears That the Public Will Be Misled by Statements as to
Quality Are Groundless
Part II details the Supreme Court's and bar associations' cur-
rent prohibitions on lawyers advertising the quality of their serv-
ices.4" These prohibitions, allegedly based on fears that
consumers will be misled by claims as to quality, are illogical.4 ,
There are no restrictions on a lawyer extolling the "quality" of
39 See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's
Unethical Violations in The Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 992-96
(discussing abatement of disciplinary actions by Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission).
40 See supra note 11. The United States Supreme Court in Bates used the
Curran report findings substantiating the public's distrust of the legal
system to support its conclusion that the public needed to be better
informed. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370 n.23 (1977).
41 Bates, 433 U.S. at 370 n.21 (footnote omitted) (citing MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 115-16 (1975);John
G. Branca & Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The
Implications of Goldfarb, 24 UCLA L. REV. 475, 516-17 (1977)).
42 See infra part II. Most states prohibit advertised statements concerning
quality or "puffing." Andrews, supra note 1, at 1004-05; see infra notes 178-
85 and accompanying text.
43 Prior to the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the FTC urged the ABA to clarify ambiguities in the proposed
definition of "a false or misleading communication" contained in proposed
Model Rule 7.1. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at
152-54. The FTC's advice went unheeded. See id. at 154. The FTC has
since urged the ABA to abandon any specific definition and adopt a simpler
rule: "A lawyer shall not make a false or deceptive communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services." See id. at 154-55.
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her work to a client consulting face-to-face for the first time.
Should the public not be protected in that situation as well? If we
were to apply the same bright line to other services, should car
garages be prevented from advertising the quality of their trans-
mission service because consumers may lack knowledge about the
technicalities of transmission repair? In fact, unverifiable opin-
ions as to quality, frequently labeled "puffing," are a defense to
claims of false advertising with respect to other products or serv-
ices under the Federal Trade Commission Act.44 Nonetheless,
many states bar self-laudatory claims by lawyers, even if
"verifiable." 45
The Supreme Court and the Bar are overreaching in their
attempts to safeguard the public from advertisements they con-
sider to be deceptive. The public, confronted every day by self-
laudatory claims of suppliers of products and services, has already
demonstrated its skepticism toward self-laudatory claims by law-
yers. Of 361 consumers polled in a 1983 study, 43 percent did
not necessarily believe that advertisements by lawyers would be
truthful.46 Those who complain that professional ads are mis-
leading are attorneys, not consumers.47
5. Current Information Supplied to Consumers Has Failed
to Meet Their Needs
The profession should expand information dispensed to con-
sumers because the current amount consumers receive is not
44 Puffing is a defense to a claim of false advertising under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe,
Inc., v. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that a statement by a collection agency, "We're the low cost
commercial collection expert," was not a factual misrepresentation, but a
general assertion of superiority, and therefore not actionable under the
Lanham Act); see also Frederick C. Moss, The Ethics of Law Practice Marketing,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 601, 624 (1986) (citing other sources).
45 Andrews, supra note 1, at 988.
46 M. Jeffrey Kallis & Dinoo J. Vanier, Consumer Perceptions of Attorney and
Legal Service Advertising: A Managerial Approach to the Delivery of Legal Services,
AKRON Bus. & EcON. REV., Winter 1983, at 42, 45.
47 See Calvani et al., supra note 33, at 781 (citing evidence from the health
care profession); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 667 n. 11 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (asserting that it was not members of the public who
complained that Zauderer's advertisement was misleading).
[Vol. 25:283
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meeting their needs.4" Where a service, such as law, is not always
standardized, consumers need more information than they would
for a standardized product.4 9 Yet, as Part II demonstrates, the
legal profession dispenses less information than that dispensed
about routine services and products.
II. WHAT CONSUMERS GET AND WHY IT Is NOT ENOUGH
Four potential sources of information for consumers are (1)
lawyer advertising, (2) attorney directories, (3) referral services,
and (4) listings of lawyers sanctioned for malpractice. This part
will describe each source and indicate its inadequacies in provid-
ing information to consumers. Despite the altruistic intentions of
some of these services to reach out to consumers, 50 closer scru-
tiny of information they offer to the public indicates that these
services do more to aid the legal profession than the public. The
self-serving nature with which the information is dispensed can
only exacerbate the distrust the public has for the legal
profession.5 '
A. Attorney Advertising
Attorneys have been permitted to advertise since the Supreme
Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 52 in 1977. Follow-
ing its decision in Bates, the Supreme Court has continued to
establish vague guidelines for state bars to develop their own
standards for regulating attorney advertising. Unfortunately,
both the standards of the Supreme Court and those developed by
state bars prohibit lawyers from advertising information that
would be helpful to consumers seeking an attorney to suit their
needs, including information about the quality of a lawyer's
services.
1. The Supreme Court's Standards
The Supreme Court first articulated standards for the states to
follow in prohibiting attorneys' advertisements in In re R.M.J. ,5 a
48 Dyer & Shimp, supra note 8.
49 See generally Darden et al., supra note 4.
50 For example, the State Bar of California publishes a leaflet for
consumers entitled What Can A Lawyer Referral Service Do For Me?.
51 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
52 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
53 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
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case following Bates. Using the test established in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 54 the
Court indicated that a state may restrict ads that are "inherently
likely to deceive" and ones that the record indicates did deceive.5 5
On the other hand, the state may not absolutely prohibit poten-
tially misleading information that may be offered in a nondecep-
tive manner, such as a listing of areas of practice.56 Yet the state
may still regulate ads that are not misleading, provided the state
has a substantial state interest in the regulation and such regula-
tion is restricted to serve that interest.5 The Court in R.M.J. fur-
ther acknowledged that the above standards are imprecise
guidelines and that the parameters of permissible advertising can
be uncovered only on a case-by-case basis.58
The Court has articulated more specific standards since R.MJ..
A state may not impose "prophylactic rules," such as a ban on the
use of illustrations or legal advice in advertisements, to facilitate
discernment of advertisements that might be deceptive. 59 How-
ever, states may require disclosure of information, such as that
regarding contingent fee agreements, where omission might mis-
lead the public.6' Moreover, states may forbid "unverifiable"
claims as to the quality of lawyers' services, although lawyers may
advertise verifiable facts, such as schools attended or certification,
54 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980). The test stated in Central Hudson, a case
involving a city regulation prohibiting electric utilities from advertising to
promote the use of electricity, is as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Id. at 566.
55 R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202-03.
56 Id. at 203.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 204 n.16.
59 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643-49
(1985).
60 Id. at 650-53.
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from which a consumer might infer quality.6'
A hazy bottom line as to the type of advertisement an attorney
could currently publish without jeopardizing the attorney's right
to practice law might be drawn as follows: An ad that is not inher-
ently misleading, in that it is composed of accurate and verifiable
facts from which one may infer, but which do not assert, the qual-
ity of services, provided that the ad does not actually mislead the
public or have the potential to mislead the public such that the
state's interest in protecting the public overrides the public's
need for such information. A problem with the above standard is
that, by its obvious contorted and confusing nature,62 it raises a
host of questions and contradictions. As a result of the questions
and contradictions raised, state bars, as well as attorneys, have
erred on the side of caution in releasing information to the con-
sumer. 63 Even worse, the standard fails to address the real
issue-whether the consumer's need for further information has
been met.
One question related to the consumer's needs that the standard
raises is whether only factual claims are verifiable. An attorney's
claim that she provides "knowledgeable service" in worker's com-
pensation claims and is able to substantiate it with years of experi-
ence would be prohibited as not being factual, although it is
verifiable. Similarly, an attorney may wish to advertise that he is
responsive to clients, verifying the claim with client evaluations of
his work. Yet, because such a claim is not a fact, despite its ver-
ifiability, the public would be precluded from receiving this infor-
mation on the quality of the lawyer's services.
Another issue the standard raises is whether there is a distin-
guishable difference between opinions and inferences of quality,
the former being prohibited while the latter are allowed. Apply-
ing the rule to the above illustrations, attorneys may publish years
of experience, or in some states, even office hours, as the claims
only imply quality. But attorneys may not state that they are
experienced or responsive to clients because such statements are
61 Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S. Ct.
2281, 2288 (1990).
62 For an excellent analysis of the confusion caused by varying and
conflicting standards regarding advertisements prior to Peel, see Moss, supra
note 44, at 602-45, and Timothy J. Williams, Comment, Specialization:
Recognizing De Facto Specialization and the Fundamental Right of the Attorney to
Advertise, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 573 (1990).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 64-80.
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opinions about the quality of service provided. In essence, attor-
neys may claim only how they are experienced, not that they are
experienced.
2. State Bars' Regulations
To encourage state bars to develop their own regulations on
advertising, in 1977 the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising
proposed two models for attorney advertising regulations.64 Pro-
posal A, adopted by thirty-one states, as well as by the ABA in its
Model Code of Professional Responsibility as Disciplinary Rule 2-
101 (hereafter "DR 2-101"),65 states twenty-five criteria attorneys
may advertise, such as schools attended, foreign language ability,
and office hours.' Proposal B, adopted by nineteen states, more
generally prohibits ads that are false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive.67  Some states also prohibit ads that are self-
laudatory.68
Both proposals prohibit claims as to quality-information the
public has expressly requested.6 9 DR 2-101 forbids those claims
found to be "false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-lauda-
tory or unfair, ' 70 as well as those that are undignified. 7' Based
upon the public's lack of sophistication, 72 DR 2-101 also forbids
"representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot
be measured or verified."' 73 Proposal B prohibits public commu-
nications containing "statistical data or other information based
on past performance or prediction of future success," ' 74 "state-
ments of opinion as to the quality of the services," and "a repre-
sentation or implication regarding the quality of legal services
which is not susceptible of reasonable verification by the
public." 75
64 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 6.
65 Andrews, supra note 1, at 986-88.
66 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 2-101(B) (1980).
67 Andrews, supra note 1, at 988; see also ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 6.
68 Andrews, supra note 1, at 988.
69 See supra text accompanying note 12.
70 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101(A) (1980).
71 Id. DR 2-101(B).
72 Id. EC 2-9.
73 Id.
74 ABA Proposal B, DR 2-101(C)(2), reprinted in ANDREWS, supra note 7,
app. at 125.
75 ABA Proposal B, DR 2-101(C)(4), reprinted in ANDREWS, supra note 7,
app. at 125. Even advertising the cost of legal services-information
298 [Vol. 25:283
Finding a Suitable Lawyer
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.76 Although the Rules recognize the particular need of
persons of moderate means who have not used lawyers exten-
sively to know more about legal services, claims as to quality are
still forbidden. The Rules define misleading advertising, in part,
as those ads that "create an unjustified expectation" about results
or "compare the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services." 77
An example of information prohibited as misleading is the result
an attorney has obtained for a client.7 8
As Part III argues, by establishing a distinct set of regulations
on deceptive advertising for their own profession, thus foregoing
standards on consumer advertising already established by the
Federal Trade Commission Act,79 lawyers have ensured their self-
regulation at the public's expense. State bars, allegedly confused
by broad standards unique to attorneys enunciated by the
Supreme Court, have been overly cautious in their release of
information to the public.8 " As a result of the legal wrangle over
whether an attorney's advertisement has breached a specific stan-
dard, the desire of consumers to know more about attorneys who
might help them has been sadly forgotten.
B. Attorney Directories
National, state, county, and even city directories offer little help
to a consumer seeking information on attorney services other
than attorneys' names, biographical information, and, perhaps,
fields of practice. The information offered is simply too sparse
and inaccessible to consumers to be of any real value.
At a national level, Martindale-Hubbell"' offers attorneys'
names, listed alphabetically by state, and a brief biographical
sketch, including undergraduate and law schools, years of gradua-
expressly sought after by consumers-has been viewed as involving inherent
questions of quality and may be prohibited in some states. Scott Makar,
Note, Advertising Legal Services: The Case for Quality and Self-Laudatory Claims, 37
U. FLA. L. REV. 969, 1001 & n.203 (1985) (citing Lyon v. Alabama State Bar,
451 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1984)).
76 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990).
77 Id. Rule 7.1. The FTC specifically opposed the adoption of this rule,
stating that it is precisely this type of information that consumers would find
helpful. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44.
78 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 cmt. (1990).
79 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55(a) (1988).
80 See Makar, supra note 75, at 985-87.
81 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1991).
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tion, and address. It even provides a ranking of attorneys' reputa-
tion in the field; however, the rankings are by local attorneys, not
clients. Furthermore, it does not restrict listings by attorneys who
have been disciplined by state bars or courts. Another apparent
drawback of the directory is that it is not "user-friendly," due to
the vast quantities of information it holds. Listings may be diffi-
cult for the consumer to decode8 2 and are only alphabetized by
name, not listed according to area of practice. The public would
most likely be better off calling a local referral agency for infor-
mation than using a national directory.
For consumers who want to know names of attorneys within a
particular state, there are state-wide listings available. For exam-
ple, Parker and Son Publishers, Inc., publishes a directory of Cali-
fornia attorneys 83 that lists attorneys by geographical area of
practice, such as Los Angeles or Sacramento. It lists the attor-
ney's name, firm, address, telephone number, and field of certifi-
cation, if available. Volume II of the directory lists information
helpful to attorneys, such as lists of courts, court reporters,
paralegals, and expert witnesses. Both volumes are available for
$27.00.
Directories are also published on a municipal level. For exam-
ple, The Daily Transcript of San Diego publishes a directory of
attorneys practicing in San Diego84 that includes the attorney's
name, firm name and address, telephone number, and optional
name of law school and graduation date. The directory is avail-
able for $10.00.
Again, the problems with such directories are that they offer
sparse information, are not widely circulated to members of the
public, and are expensive. A consumer could get almost the same
amount of information from a referral agency without having to
pay for a directory or hunt one down in a public library. The
directories may be useful to members of the profession seeking
information on opposition or co-counsel in a case, but they are
not formatted or detailed for inquiring consumers to use to gain
insight into the integrity or quality of attorneys' services.
82 A typical listing is as follows: Gordon, Debra K .... '59 '84 C.999
B.A. L. 1049J.D.[Estep, W. & G.].
83 PARKER DIRECTORY OF CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS (Mary Redondo ed., 72d
ed., 1991).
84 ATrORNEY DIRECTORY (1991).
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C. Referral Services
Persons of moderate income who can afford reasonable legal
fees but cannot find a lawyer are turning more frequently to law-
yer referral services. According to ABA statistics, there are 329
bar association-sponsored non-profit lawyer referral services in
the country.85 California now boasts 74 non-profit lawyer referral
services, which projected contacts by 800,000 California residents
in 1990.86 The Chicago Bar Association's Lawyer Referral Ser-
vice averages 2,500 calls per month, and the Houston Lawyer
Referral accepts more than 500 calls per day."7
The referral services have the potential to provide a wealth of
attorney information to the inquiring public, yet the information
the majority now dispense on attorney members of their referral
panels is minimal. The real beneficiaries are not the consumers,
but the services, which charge panel membership fees, and the
attorneys, who are provided with clients.
Typically, a referral service will give a caller the name of a law-
yer who claims to practice in the caller's problem area and will
certify that the lawyer is a member of the bar in good standing
and has malpractice insurance. 8 Some services will offer a caller
only names of attorneys practicing locally,89 while a few of the
more sophisticated services provide computerized match-ups as
to specialty and neighborhood locale.90
Thus, at best, a consumer can get the name of a lawyer who
specializes in a specific area, has a valid license to practice law,
and has malpractice insurance. Consumers cannot get informa-
tion they have expressly requested, such as office hours, years of
practice in a certain field, and complaint records. 9 Moreover,
claims of lawyer expertise in certain areas are usually based on the
lawyers' own claims that they are proficient in that area.92 Obvi-
85 See Margaret Fisk, A Good Lawyer Can Be Hard to Find, NAT'L L.J., May
29, 1989, at 1.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 30.
89 Id. at 1.
90 Id. at 30.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
92 Fisk, supra note 85, at 30. Although a few services do require proof of
expertise, an ABA survey of the 329 referral services indicates that only
15% had experience requirements for lawyers listed in areas of general
practice and only 21% had experience requirements for lawyers listed on
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ously it is in the lawyer's financial interest to profess as many
areas of expertise as possible.93
Although referral services claim to screen their attorneys for
ethical violations, the violation must reach advanced stages in the
complaint process, such as the lodging of formal charges, official
reprimand by the state bar, or a complaint pending before the
state supreme court, before the referral service will screen the
attorney.94 Until such point, the public has no access to com-
plaint records.95
With the increasing number of referral agencies serving as
sources of business for lawyers, profit-making referral agencies,
some with little concern for screening for expertise or ethical vio-
lations, have sprouted.96 To better regulate these services, states
are beginning to enact minimum standards,97 including certifica-
tion or experience requirements.9 8 But once again, the legisla-
specialty panels. Id.; see also Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 718 (1977) ("Lawyer referral
services have, for a number of years, been assigning clients to particular
lawyers based solely on the lawyers' assertions as to which cases they believe
themselves competent to handle.").
93 One might argue that a lawyer's claim of expertise to a referral service
is the same as a lawyer's advertised claim. However, because bar-sponsored
agencies promote the claim, claims may very well have more credence to a
consumer than claims by individual lawyers in local advertisements.
Therefore, the referral service should have a higher standard of care in
ensuring that any claims of expertise are valid or in disclosing attorneys'
lack of experience to consumers.
94 Fisk, supra note 85, at 30.
95 See infra text accompanying notes 109-11.
96 See Steven Pressman, Refer Madness, CAL. LAW., July 1990, at 17; see also
Craig Weinerman, Should You Buy A Case From This Referral Service?, SAN
DIEGO TRIAL LAW. Ass'N TRIAL B. NEWS, Oct. 1990, at 25.
97 Pressman, supra note 96, at 17-18.
98 Fisk, supra note 85, at 30. Such experience requirements are not to be
confused with certification requirements for advertising of attorney services,
see Paul Marcotte, Certified Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 14; Thomas F.
Gibbons, The Right to Specialize, A.B.A.J., May 1990, at 57-60, although there
may be overlap between the two sets of standards. For example, a lawyer in
California who complies with the state's certification standards for a
specialty automatically meets a referral service's criteria for membership on
an experience panel. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR A LAWYER REFERRAL
SERVICE IN CALIFORNIA para. 7.2 [hereafter MINIMUM STANDARDS ACT]
(adopted Nov. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 26, 1989), reprinted in CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6155 app. (West 1990).
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tion frequently serves the attorney better than it does the
consumer.
California is one state that has already enacted minimum stan-
dards for lawyer referral services, 99 as required by California
Business and Professions Code section 6155. Although the "Min-
imum Standards for A Lawyer Referral Service in California"
(hereafter "the Minimum Standards Act") and Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6155 are helpful in promoting stricter regu-
lation of referral services, the purpose of the regulation appears
to be more to protect attorneys from "in-house" referral agen-
cies, which charge outside attorneys excessive fees and refer cases
primarily to their own board members,' than to educate and
protect the consumer.
The Minimum Standards Act indicates that one of its general
purposes is to "provide information about lawyers and the availa-
bility of legal services which will aid in the selection of a law-
yer, ' ' yet it offers no specific requirements as to the types or
amount of information a referral service must provide. In a bold
effort to solicit consumer input, the Minimum Standards Act also
requires annual review of a random sampling of comments by ten
percent of the clients who received referrals, yet the review is by a
committee of in-house referral service members, who are to make
"such alterations to the operation of the Service as it deems nec-
essary." 10 2 Such in-house review guarantees little in the way of
promoting consumer concerns and satisfaction.
Although concern is generally expressed for regulating the
quality of attorneys on referral panels,' 0 the Minimum Standards
Act requires each service to have only "uniform procedures" for
99 MINIMUM STANDARDS AcT, supra note 98.
100 In its provision requiring the state bar to establish minimum
standards for lawyer referral services, Business and Professions Code
section 6155 states as follows: "The minimum standards shall include
provisions ensuring that panel membership shall be open to all attorneys
practicing in the geographical area served who are qualified by virtue of
suitable experience, and limiting attorney registration and membership fees
to reasonable sums which do not discourage widespread attorney
membership." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6155(f(1).
1o MINIMUM STANDARDS AcT, supra note 98, para. 3.1(b).
102 Id. para. 5.2.
103 One of the purposes of the Minimum Standards Act is "to improve
the quality of legal services available to the public ....... Id. para. 3.1(e).
The Minimum Standards Act requires services to establish their own quality
requirements as to participation. Id. paras. 6.1, 7.2.
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removal of attorneys from panels, offering no specifics as to the
stage in the complaint process at which removal is required."°4
Review of the quality of services is conducted by the service itself,
not by outside members of the legal community and lay public. ' 0 5
The Minimum Standards Act has more specifics protecting attor-
neys' due process rights regarding removal from referral
panels 10 6 than specifics protecting consumers against unethical
lawyers.
D. Malpractice Listings
To ascertain attorney integrity or quality, consumers want
information about prior and pending complaints against the law-
yer they are interested in. 10 7 That a lawyer has been suspended
for failing to file an appeal on time, for sexually assaulting a cli-
ent, or for converting at least $30,000 in client funds are all rele-
vant factors in a consumer's choice of attorney.10 8 Unfortunately
for the consumer, access to such information is limited. Only
"public" information is published; moreover, sources of public
information are not as accessible to consumers as they should be.
1. How a Consumer's Complaint Against an Attorney
Becomes Public
In twenty-eight states, a complaint becomes public when, after
a full investigation, the complaint is proven to be accurate and
grounds for disciplinary action exist.' 0 9 At that point, a formal
notice to show cause issues, and the list of charges filed with the
104 Id. para. 6.4 ("Each service shall establish a uniform procedure for
review of refusals to admit to, and decisions to suspend or remove from,
membership on any panel.").
105 Id. para. 7.4 ("The governing committee or their designee of each
Service is required to establish a method of review for continued panel
membership. Such review shall evaluate the quality of services provided by
member attorneys and be conducted at least once every two years.").
106 Id. para. 6.4 ("In every case where a Service refuses to admit an
attorney to a panel or suspends or expels an attorney from a panel, the
Service must give the attorney a written statement of the reasons for its
decision and offer the attorney a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his
or her defense.").
107 For a discussion of how prior disciplinary action might affect attorney
services, see Murray, supra note 5, at 970-72.
108 Id. at 968-70.
109 Charles-Edward Anderson, The Gag is Removed, A.B.A. J., June 1990,
at 22, 23.
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state court becomes a matter of public record. Twenty states do
not permit complaints to be released to the public until sanctions
are actually imposed."'
Until a complaint becomes public, the complainant is not per-
mitted to discuss the case."' The articulated rationale for this
"gag rule" is to protect the public's interest in the integrity of the
judicial system." 12 Only two states, Oregon and Florida, have
agreed to lift their gag rules, thereby allowing a consumer to dis-
close the filing of a formal disciplinary complaint against a
lawyer. " 3
The great majority of complaints never reach the stage where
most jurisdictions would permit their public disclosure. A 1988
report issued by HALT, a legal reform group, states that less than
2 percent of more than 70,000 complaints filed with state attorney
discipline agencies resulted in public discipline. Ninety percent
were dismissed." 4 In 1986, California received an estimated
8574 complaints about attorney conduct." 5 As a result of those
110 Id. at 23. It is noteworthy that this policy directly contradicts ABA
Model Rule for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 16(B), which states,
"Upon filing and service of formal charges . .. the proceeding should be
public, except for: (1) deliberations of the hearing committee, board, or
court; or (2) information with respect to which the hearing committee has
issued a protective order." MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT Rule 16(B) (1989). As the Commentary to Rule 16 notes,
"Once a finding of probable cause has been made, there is no longer a
danger that the allegations against the respondent are frivolous. The need
to assure the integrity of the disciplinary process in the eyes of the public
requires that at this point further proceedings are open to the public." Id.
Rule 16 cmt.
The constitutionality of the policy is also subject to question. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-45 (1978)
(holding that the First Amendment does not permit criminal sanctions
against third parties who publish truthful information on confidential
proceedings of a Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, even though the
state constitution and statutes proclaim such proceedings to be
confidential).
I I Anderson, supra note 109. This policy is also of questionable
constitutionality. See Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837-45.
112 See, e.g., Daily Gazette Co. v. Committee on Legal Ethics of the State
Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705, 709 (W.Va. 1984).
113 Anderson, supra note 109.
114 Samuel Greengard, Lawyer Discipline Today, BARRISTER, Spring 1990,
at 11.
115 ABA CTR. FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY & THE STANDING COMM.
ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1
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complaints, the California Bar formally charged only 192 lawyers
with disciplinary violations and ultimately sanctioned only 185.' 16
The profession's reticence to publish attorneys' errors results in
practitioners' impression that they can "get away with" certain
unethical conduct. 117 Private reprovals do not have the dire
results of eliminating potential clients, who could otherwise learn
of attorneys' misdeeds. The legal profession looks particularly
defensive compared to other professions, such as business and
medicine, because the members of these other professions appear
to be disciplined more regularly." 8
2. Sources That Provide Public Information on Attorney
Misconduct
Three current sources of information on attorney malfeasance
are (1) the National Discipline Data Bank, (2) journal publica-
tions, and (3) state bar hotlines.
The National Discipline Data Bank is a nationwide clearing-
house of information on attorneys publicly disciplined by federal
and state courts and federal administrative agencies. The Ameri-
can Bar Association's Center for Professional Responsibility cre-
ated the clearinghouse in 1968 to prevent lawyers disciplined in
one jurisdiction from illicitly practicing in another." 9 Thus, its
purpose is to make attorney information more available to state
bars, not to the public.
Public access to the Data Bank's records is limited. The public
is not permitted access to cumulative lists of lawyers disciplined; a
consumer can find out only if a certain lawyer has been disci-
(1987) [hereafter LAWYER DISCIPLINE SURVEY] (Chart I), cited in Lisa G.
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 748 n.352 (1990).
116 LAWYER DISCIPLINE SURVEY, supra note 115, at 1.
117 See generally Lerman, supra note 115.
118 Two percent of all attorneys against whom complaints were lodged in
Illinois in 1987 were disciplined. Sixty-six percent of all other professionals
against whom complaints were brought were disciplined. Greengard, supra
note 114, at 14.
119 See publication by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility,
National Discipline Data Bank Services.
The Data Bank now has information voluntarily submitted by disciplinary
agencies created by each jurisdiction's highest court. Just recently, however,
the Bank has asked reporting agencies to expand the type of information
they submit to include court orders, disciplinary board findings, and hearing
committee reports. New Procedures to Improve Discipline Data Bank Services,
PROF. LAw., May 1991, at 5.
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plined in the current year. Although there is a hotline number
regarding individual names of lawyers disciplined, members of
the public cannot call, but must submit their requests in writing,
stating the purpose of their inquiry. Each inquiry costs $5.00.
The Data Bank contains only names of lawyers who have been
publicly disciplined. In the majority of cases, where sanctions
indicate private reproval, the attorney's name is not published.
For those consumers frustrated by the limited access to attor-
ney information through the Data Bank, a second potential
source of information on attorneys disciplined is journal listings.
Attorney sanctions are listed daily in California in the L.A. Daily
Journal and the San Francisco Daily Journal. The public has access
to both. Reprovals are also published in The California Lawyer, a
monthly publication mailed to all lawyers practicing in the state.
But combing through back issues to see if a particular attorney's
name is listed is too inefficient to be a realistic option for consum-
ers. Such lists are generally of greater interest to other practicing
attorneys, who may recognize the names published or who want
to become more familiar with the type of conduct that incurs for-
mal discipline.
A third method for the public to find out whether certain attor-
neys have been publicly sanctioned is through state bar hotline
services." ° In California, information on attorneys is available,
although not as well publicized nor as accessible as it could be. A
hotline number for the State Bar of California is listed in the
Pacific Bell Yellow Pages.' 21 Consumers must call the number to
obtain an attorney's state bar number. The Bar will also state
whether the attorney has been publicly sanctioned for a discipli-
nary violation. 122 To obtain information about what the discipli-
nary violation was, a consumer must call the State Bar Court in
Los Angeles. The State Bar Court will release copies of public
records on a case at a cost of fifty cents per page. However, deci-
sions still under investigation, decisions that pertain to attorneys
120 Unfortunately, local bars, usually more accessible to consumers, do
not have such services. The San Diego County Bar Association has only the
following information on attorneys: name, address, telephone, law school,
graduation date, bar passage date, and date of membership in county bar.
Telephone Interview with Representative, San Diego County Bar
Association (Oct. 10, 1990).
121 See PACIFIC BELL SMART YELLOW PAGES, Local Access Pages (1991).
122 Telephone. Interview with Representative, State Bar of California
(May 28, 1991).
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who are not members of the state bar, and decisions in which the
mental stability of the attorney is questioned are not available to
the public.' 23
The description of potential sources of information for con-
sumers set forth above shows that all are inadequate in disclosing
information the public wants to know. The legal profession's
answer, in part, to the absence of available information on disci-
plined attorneys is to police the profession from within by
encouraging such practices as "peer review" systems 1'2 4 and
"blowing the whistle" on other attorneys.1'2 5 Although a positive
step within the profession, these methods foster the "closed"
nature of the practice of law. Rather than emphasizing self-polic-
ing practices, the profession should emphasize practices that
enable consumers to make their own decisions on an attorney's
quality or integrity by giving them the information they need.
III. WHY CONSUMERS CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT THEY WANT
Parts I and II demonstrated the gap between what consumers
want and what they get concerning attorney information. Essen-
tially, the public wants information concerning the quality and
integrity of lawyers, but standards designed by the Supreme
Court and regulations imposed by bar associations hinder, rather
than promote, consumers' access to this information. Part III
describes how the framework of the Supreme Court's decisions
and the reluctance of state bar associations perpetuate this gap
between what the public wants and what it gets.
A. The Framework for the Supreme Court's Decisions
One reason for the gap is that the framework for the Supreme
Court's decisions on attorney advertising has focused too much
on regulating attorneys' rights instead of on dispensing needed
information to the public. This framework is, in part, a result of
the parties to the lawsuits being attorneys, rather than consumers.
The decision-makers are also attorneys, who desire to maintain
123 Id..
124 For discussions of voluntary peer review systems, see Spaeth, supra
note 37, at 1228-32 and Susan R. Martyn, Peer Review and Quality Assurance for
Lawyers, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 295, 314-18 (1989).
125 See generally Rotunda, supra note 39. For a discussion of ethical
obligations of the judiciary to report incompetent attorneys, see Forer, supra
note 38.
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the unique status of the profession. Thus, the issue is viewed
through the lens of lawyers attempting to safeguard their own
professional interests, rather than that of consumers seeking
information about the legal profession.
1. Attorneys as Petitioners
In the cases where the Supreme Court has addressed the issue
of attorney advertising, attorneys, not consumers, have petitioned
the Court. As a result, the Court's task has been to balance the
First Amendment right of attorneys to advertise against the inter-
ests of state bar associations in using prophylactic rules to restrict
attorney advertisements. Although the Court has used the pub-
lic's need for information to support the expansion of the right of
attorneys to advertise, emphasis on the right of consumers to
receive information has steadily decreased.
The Supreme Court's earliest treatment of commercial adver-
tising was in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.."6 In that case, consumers (an individual user
of prescription drugs and two non-profit organizations) brought
an action to void a statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertis-
ing the price of prescription drugs.' 27 The consumers argued
that the statute violated their First Amendment right to receive
information.' 28 Upholding the lower court's decision voiding the
state ban, the Supreme Court expressed strong rhetorical con-
cern for safeguarding the public's First Amendment right to com-
mercial information. The Court stated that the issue was not the
pharmacists' First Amendment right to advertise, but the public's
First Amendment right to receive information. 2 9 The Court rec-
ognized society's strong interest in the free flow of information1
3 0
and asserted that people will perceive their own best interests, if
only they are well enough informed.' 3 1 The Court also acknowl-
edged that the lack of information on pharmaceuticals hits hard-
126 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
127 Id. at 748. Interestingly, the lower court had upheld the statutory
prohibition in a prior case where pharmacists, not consumers, were the
plaintiffs. Id. (citing Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D.
Va. 1969)).
128 Id. at 753-54.
129 Id. at 756-57.
130 Id. at 764.
131 Id. at 770.
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est the poor, the sick, and the aged.'
In 1977 the Supreme Court opened the door to attorney adver-
tising with its decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,'3 3 in which
the Court held that the blanket suppression of attorney advertis-
ing by a state bar was unconstitutional. 134 However, in Bates, the
petitioners were attorneys who wished to advertise their fees, not
consumers who wished to be informed of lawyers' prices.' 5 As a
result, the decision is not framed in accordance with the First
Amendment's protection of consumers' right to receive informa-
tion. Instead, the emphasis is on attorneys' right to advertise and
how the states ought to regulate such advertisement.
The Court stated the issue as "whether lawyers. . . may consti-
tutionally advertise the prices" of routine legal services, not
whether the public has a right to such knowledge. 36 In fact, the
Court in Bates only briefly acknowledged consumers' First
Amendment right to receive such information by its comment
that a justice of the Arizona State Court viewed the issue as the
right of consumers to know about the legal profession, rather
than regulation of the profession. 3 7 Although the Court in Bates
recognized the public's need for information to select an attor-
ney, particularly the needs of the "not-quite-poor and the
unknowledgeable" for greater access to attorneys, 138 the Court's
language is used to rebut the state's arguments against attorney
132 Id. at 763.
'33 433 U.S. 350 (1977). For almost 60 years preceding Bates, attorneys
had not been permitted to advertise. Andrews, supra note 1, at 968.
134 Bates, 433 U.S. at 382-83. In Bates, two attorneys questioned the
validity of an Arizona State Bar rule that prohibited advertising by attorneys.
The attorneys had advertised in a local newspaper that they offered "legal
services at very reasonable fees," listing their fees for some of the services
offered.
135 Id. at 382-83.
136 Id. at 367 (emphasis deleted). In this particular case, the Court found
that the advertisement's references to a "legal clinic," its offer of attorney
services at "very reasonable prices," and its failure to inform consumers that
they do not necessarily require attorney services for a name change were not
misleading. Id. at 381-82. In so holding, the Court rejected the state bar's
arguments that attorney advertising would tarnish the profession's
reputation, mislead the public, stir up unnecessary litigation, prohibit new
attorneys from entering the field, decrease the quality of service, or be too
difficult to regulate. Id. at 368-72.
137 Id. at 358.
138 Id. at 376-77.
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advertising, not to confirm consumers' First Amendment right to
attorney information.
Since Bates, the Supreme Court cases concerning attorney
advertising-In re R.M.J.,' 9 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel,'4 ° and Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois ' 4 -have all been brought by attorneys wishing to publish
certain information. As a result, the issues have been framed as
whether specific state regulations unconstitutionally prohibit spe-
cific information attorneys wish to publish. Repeatedly, the Court
has been compelled to look at the dispensing of attorney informa-
tion in terms of attorneys' needs, rather than consumers'.
The specific issue in R.M.J. was whether the Missouri State Bar
Rules requiring attorneys to list areas of practice in express legal
terms and forbidding attorneys from listing areas they are
licensed to practice violated the attorney-appellant's First
Amendment rights.' 42 In holding Missouri's regulations to be
unconstitutional,' 43 the Court only briefly acknowledged that the
information advertised could be helpful to the public.'4 4 The
Court made no mention in its decision of the public's right to
such information under the First Amendment. Instead, the major
'39 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
140 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
14' 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
142 R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 193. The Missouri State Bar Rules required
attorneys to limit advertised information to 10 categories, which did not
include areas licensed to practice. The Rules also required attorneys to
describe their practice according to language specified in the Rules and to
include a disclaimer. The Rules prohibited general mailings of
announcement cards. Id. at 194-96.
The attorney-appellant was sanctioned by the Missouri Supreme Court
for listing the courts where he was licensed to practice, for listing areas of
practice in language other than that required (e.g., "personal injury"
instead of "tort law"), for refusing to include a disclaimer, and for mailing
announcement cards to persons other than those listed by the rule. The
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the first three rules
without explaining the rationale for its decision. The court did not
comment on the constitutionality of the rule on the mailing of
announcements. The attorney-appellant admitted his failure to include a
disclaimer. Thus, the issues on appeal were restricted to his description of
practice and states licensed. Id. at 197-98.
143 Id. at 205.
144 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the attorney's use of words a
layperson might understand was "more informative" than the legal terms
required by the state bar and that the attorney's listing the fact that he was
licensed to practice in two states could be "highly relevant." Id. at 205-06.
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portion of the decision focused upon regulation of attorneys'
right to advertise. The Court set forth standards 45 to guide state
bars in analyzing the constitutionality of their restrictions and
then interpreted the facts of the case under the established
guidelines.
Zauderer is a further example of a decision that is framed in
terms of the state's right to regulate attorneys' First Amendment
rights, not the First Amendment right of the consumer to receive
information. Because it was an attorney who initiated the lawsuit,
claiming that Ohio's Disciplinary Rules prohibiting his advertise-
ment were unconstitutional, 46 the Court presented the issue as
"regarding the regulation of commercial speech by attorneys,"147
not regarding the rights of consumers to receive certain informa-
tion an attorney wished to convey. Once again, the Court
acknowledged the benefits to the public in releasing additional
information, 4 but only to justify First Amendment protection of
attorneys' right to commercial speech, not as grounds for con-
sumers' right to information: "[T]he extension of First Amend-
ment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides
... ,,4' Reversing the lower court's findings, the Supreme
Court in Zauderer ruled that the state may not discipline an attor-
ney for a newspaper advertisement containing a nondeceptive
illustration and legal advice.'5 ° However, a state may require
attorneys to disclose information regarding fee arrangements in
their advertisements.' 5 '
145 See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
146 Zauderer had placed an ad in Ohio newspapers. The ad contained an
illustration of a Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device and certain legal advice
concerning litigation over the Dalkon Shield. The ad also stated that clients
would not owe any legal fees if there were no recovery. Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 631 (1985). The State Supreme
Court of Ohio upheld the findings of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel that
Zauderer's ad violated Ohio's Disciplinary Rules. Id. at 635. In confirming
the constitutionality of the Ohio Rules, the state court held that disclosure
requirements regarding contingency fees prevented the public from being
misled, that it was "allowable" to prevent attorneys' claims of expertise
absent specified standards for assessment, and that it was "reasonable" to
forbid illustrations and statements of legal advice. Id. at 636.
147 Id. at 629.
148 Id. at 646-47.
149 Id. at 651.
150 Id. at 655-56.
151 Id. at 655. In reversing the state court's findings as to the illustrations
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In Peel, the issue was, again, a narrow one, focusing on the right
of attorneys to advertise. The question presented by Peel, the
attorney-petitioner, was whether Peel's assertion on his letter-
head that he was certified as a civil trial specialist by the National
Board of Trial Advocacy was protected by the First Amend-
ment. 152 The Supreme Court held that Peel's letterhead was
neither actually nor inherently misleading and that the state's
interest in preventing consumers from being misled was insuffi-
cient to justify a prophylactic ban on statements of certifica-
tion.' 53 However, the major portion of the decision constitutes a
debate between the justices about whether Peel's statements were
misleading, inherently misleading, or potentially misleading.
Four justices believed Peel's statement to be protected by the
First Amendment, three justices believed the statement to be
inherently misleading, and two justices believed the statement to
be potentially misleading."M Although the Court recognized that
the disclosure of truthful information benefits the public, 55 the
public's constitutional right to such information seems to be a
concern of the past.
and legal advice, the United States Supreme Court asserted that the ad's
illustration and advice were not misleading, but accurate. Id. at 639.
Zauderer did not make any claims of expertise or statements relating to the
quality of his services, but only stated factually that he had represented
other women in Dalkon Shield litigation, was willing to continue to do so,
and that such litigation was not time-barred. Id. at 640. Furthermore, there
was no substantial government interest in precluding the advertisement. Id.
at 641-47.
152 Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S.
Ct. 2281, 2284, 2287. Peel's letterhead stated:
Gary E. Peel
Certified Civil Trial Specialist
By the National Board of Trial.Advocacy
Licensed: Illinois, Missouri, Arizona
Id. at 2285. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Peel's letterhead was not
protected by the First Amendment because the juxtaposition of certification
and state licensure could mislead the public into thinking that his licensure
stemmed from his certification, because his claim of certification attests to
the quality of his services, and because the juxtaposition of the term "spe-
cialist" with the states of licensure could mislead the public into believing
states confirmed the title of "specialist." Id. at 2286-87.
153 Id. at 2293.
154 Id. at 2297 (White, J, dissenting).
155 Id. at 2292-93.
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2. Attorneys' Unique Status
The framework of regulating of attorneys' rights is also a result
of the Court's flawed assumption that lawyers constitute a unique
profession.' 56 This belief supports the Court's and the bar
associations' development of regulations on attorney advertising
that are different from those on other professions. 157 One way in
which the Court has asserted the unique status of lawyers is by
prohibiting advertisements that reflect upon the quality of law-
yers' services-information consumers have specifically requested
and ought to have. The Court's belief in the uniqueness of law-
yers also confines the legal profession to developing, interpret-
ing, and criticizing regulations on attorney advertising, rather
than expanding its lens to view what the consumer wants to know.
The Court has become overly involved in the "micromanage-
ment' 158 of state regulations, thereby directing attention away
from consumers' constitutional right to information.
Virginia Pharmacy concerned pharmacists, not lawyers, 159 yet the
Court's dicta foreshadowed its view that advertisements by attor-
neys would be treated differently from those by other profession-
als. The Court cautioned that because the professions of law and
medicine dispense "services," rather than "standardized prod-
156 The Supreme Court's assumption that lawyers' singularity mandates
separate regulations is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it is arguable
whether lawyers' services are any more unique than those of social workers,
environmental engineers, or mortgage brokers. The requirements of
professional uniqueness have yet to be defined. Second, if lawyers' services
are unique, the requirement of separate regulations on attorney advertising
is not necessarily a logical, much less a practical, consequence. Certainly,
every avocation would like to create, interpret, and adjudicate its own
standards on advertising. That lawyers' standards are different from those
of most avocations appears to stem from the fact that lawyers themselves are
deciding that their own profession is unique and that such singularity
requires unique regulations.
157 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158 The Court's shift in focus is acknowledged by Justice O'Connor in her
dissent in Peel: "The plurality has thereby deserted the sole policy reason
that justifies its headlong plunge into micromanagement of state bar rules-
facilitation of a 'consumer's access to legal services.' " Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2299 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
majority opinion, 110 S. Ct. at 2293).
159 See supra text accompanying note 127.
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ucts," possibilities for deception in advertising are enhanced." 6°
Former Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Virginia Pharmacy
stressed the differences between legal and medical services and
standardized products. 16 ' He argued that the need for regulation
of lawyers is "especially great," since they administer justice and
are officers of the courts. 162 His concurrence also foreshadowed
the Court's prohibition on lawyers' claims of quality. He sug-
gested that law's status as a "learned profession"' 63 and the pro-
fessional judgment required of attorneys" might make it too
difficult to judge the quality of services and thus evaluate which
claims are misleading. 165
Although the Bates Court described as anachronistic the argu-
ment that lawyers are "above" trade, 166 it still distinguished the
services of attorneys from other professionals 167 to justify its pro-
hibition on lawyers' claims of quality. The Court rationalized its
prohibition on quality claims by inferring that the profession was
uniquely complex, as well as potentially unscrupulous. The
Court argued that the public lacked understanding of lawyers'
practices: "[Blecause the public lacks sophistication concerning
legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropri-
ate in legal advertising."' 68 Lawyers' claims as to the quality of
their services, which the Court claimed could not be measured or
verified, may be "so likely to be misleading as to warrant restric-
tion."' 69 Based on the ability of lawyers to take advantage of
unsophisticated consumers, Former Chief Justice Burger
160 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1975).
161 Id. at 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring). However, as Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, the Court failed to explain why certain
legal and medical "services," such as title searches and routine check ups,
are not also "standardized." Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 775.
166 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977).
167 Id. at 383.
168 Id. (citations omitted). Paradoxically, the Court's assertion here
contradicts its earlier criticism of the state bar's argument that the public is
not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising. Id. at 374-
75.
169 Id. at 383.
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expressed his concerns for protecting the public: "To be sure, the
public needs information concerning attorneys, their work, and
their fees. At the same time, the public needs protection from the
unscrupulous or the incompetent practitioner anxious to prey on
the uninformed." 170
In R.M.J. the Supreme Court reinforced the state's role in
developing specific regulations pertaining to lawyer advertising to
ensure the public's protection. Following its earlier logic in Bates,
the Court in R.M.J. stated, "The public's comparative lack of
knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police them-
selves, and the absence of any standardization in the 'product'
renders advertising for professional services especially suscepti-
ble to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in control-
ling. 7' " In abolishing the states' prophylactic ban on certain
types of attorney advertising, the Zauderer Court urged the states
to analyze complaints about legal advertising in greater depth, on
a case-by-case basis. However, instead of reiterating its earlier
claims about the unique qualities of the legal profession, the plu-
rality used a contradictory rationale to rebut the State's argument
that attorneys' advertisements require prophylactic rules. The
State argued that such rules are necessary because "it is intrinsi-
cally difficult to distinguish advertisements containing legal
advice that is false or deceptive from those that are truthful and
helpful.' ' 172 To refute the State's argument, the Court asserted
that discerning deceptive statements in legal advertising is no
more difficult than in other fields of commerce. Stating that
"[t]he qualitative distinction the State has attempted to draw
eludes us,' ' 173 the Court explained that the task of discerning
truth from falsity in advertising "in virtually any field of com-
merce may require resolution of exceedingly complex and techni-
cal factual issues and the consideration of nice questions of
semantics."1 74
170 Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1981). Interestingly, the Court
replaced the conscious deception by attorneys in Bates with the "limited
ability of the professions to police themselves." See also Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2298 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644-45
(1985).
173 Id. at 646.
174 Id. at 645. In support of its assertion, the Court cited ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2, stating that such discernment "is neither
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However, the Court still imposed stricter standards on legal
advertising than on advertisements of other professions to pro-
tect consumers from potentially deceptive practices of the legal
profession. The plurality never asserted that lawyers are similar
enough to other service professionals that state bars should relin-
quish their role of regulating legal advertising to the FTC. In
fact, the Court maintained its belief in the unique status of law-
yers when it upheld Ohio's claim that rules requiring attorneys to
disclose that clients may have to pay certain expenses in contin-
gent fee arrangements were reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers. 175
The unique status of lawyers as a profession was adamantly
confirmed by the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, who
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice
O'Connor emphasized lawyers' unique status as "profession-
als," '"76 not to justify prohibitions on claims as to quality, but to
accord states greater leeway in their use of prophylactic rules to
impractical nor unduly burdensome." Id. at 646 n. 13. The Court also cited
an FTC report which concluded that regulation of deceptive attorney
advertising poses no distinct problems. Id. (citing FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 149-55). While the Court could have
been encouraging FTC regulation of lawyer advertising, the Court may only
have been suggesting that the FTC serve as a guide for the state bars in their
regulation of lawyer advertising. See Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer
Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 508 (1986).
175 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. Zauderer had advertised that "cases are
handled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients." Id. at 631. The State
claimed that the ad violated Ohio's rule that any advertisement mentioning
contingent-fee rates must "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed
before or after deduction of court costs and expenses." Id. at 633. The
State also claimed that the ad was deceptive because.it failed to mention that
consumers would be liable for costs, even if their claims failed. Id. Noting
the "unfortunate" vagueness as to precisely what Ohio attorneys must
disclose, id. at 653 n.15, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that Ohio's
rules did not violate Zauderer's First Amendment rights. Id. at 651.
176 Id. at 677 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, CJ. and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
Other portions of the opinion indicate the Justices' concern that the
professional status of lawyers has been wrongly diminished: "Lawyers are
professionals, and as such they have greater obligations. . . . While some
assert that we have left the era of professionalism in the practice of law
... " Id. at 676-77.
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prohibit legal advertisements. Justice O'Connor argued that as a
result of the complexity of legal services, there is an "enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception."' 77 State regulation is
"qualitatively different" from regulation of commercial goods. 178
Consequently, states must be allocated more deference in their
decisions to prohibit certain advertisements.17 9
In Peel, the plurality made an even stronger statement than it
had in Zauderer that lawyers are unique, both to support its hold-
ing permitting disclosure of lawyers' certification and to justify its
continuing prohibition on claims as to the quality of lawyers' serv-
ices. To support its holding, the Court veered from its prior
claims in Bates and R.M.J. that legal professionals are more decep-
tive than other professionals. Instead, the Court asserted that
lawyers are less likely to deceive because they are respected pro-
fessionals: "The presumption favoring disclosure over conceal-
ment is fortified in this case by the separate presumption that
members of a respected profession are unlikely to engage in prac-
tices that deceive their clients and potential clients."' 80 To fur-
ther support its holding that certification claims are protected by
the First Amendment, the Court relied on information from the
FTC affirming consumers' ability to distinguish claims of specialty
in fields such as foreign car repair. 18 1 The Court rejected the
"paternalistic assumption" that consumers reading Peel's letter-
head are just as vulnerable as the audience for children's televi-
sion 8 2 and criticized Justice O'Connor's dissenting concerns
about the public's lack of sophistication.183
Yet, in seeming contradiction to its assertions that attorneys
will not deceive the public and that the public will not be misled
by lawyers' claims of specialty, the Court reinforced its prohibi-
tion on attorneys advertising the quality of their services. 184 The
177 Id. at 674.
178 Id. at 676.
179 Id.
180 Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S.
Ct. 2281, 2292 (1990).
181 Id. at 2290.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 2290 n.13. Just as in Zauderer, Justice O'Connor argued strongly
that states' decisions to withhold information should be accorded more
deference because consumers lack sophistication concerning legal matters.
Id. at 2297-301 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
184 Id. at 2288.
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Court even went so far as to attempt to distinguish "statements of
opinion or quality and statements of objective facts that may sup-
port an inference of quality."'18 5 In focusing on semantic differ-
ences in legal standards to analyze states' regulation of lawyers'
advertisements, the Court seems to have forgotten what the con-
sumer deserves to know.
B. State Bars' Reluctance to Disclose Information
A second reason why consumers cannot get what they want is
that state bar associations have been reluctant to disclose infor-
mation about the profession. Although they proffer the excuse
that attorneys' unique status should exclude them from having to
disclose information, a more likely motive is their desire to main-
tain autonomy from state and federal regulations governing
commerce.
1. States' Reluctance to Allow Attorney Advertising
Despite Bates' encouragement of states to formulate their own
rules to regulate attorney advertising, bar associations have been
slow to respond 8 " and have been reluctant to incorporate public
needs into their policies. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Bates, the Department ofJustice found it necessary to file a law-
suit against the ABA for antitrust violations"8 in prohibiting law-
yer advertising.' 88 The Department dropped its suit only after
the ABA drafted Proposals A and B as models for states to fol-
low. '8 The members of the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Adver-
tising who drafted the proposals were lawyers, not consumers.19 0
185 Id. Even the Court could not agree about the status of Peel's
statement. Although the plurality deemed it a factual statement leading to
an inference of quality, Justice O'Connor, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, argued that it was a statement of quality and thus should
be prohibited. Id. at 2301 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. and
Scalia, J., dissenting).
186 Makar, supra note 75, at 987.
187 The Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975), subjected lawyers, as well as other professionals, to federal
antitrust laws. Until that point, lawyers' monopoly on price competition was
immune to federal regulation under a learned profession's exemption. Id.
at 791-92.
188 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 3.
189 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 6. For a discussion of the two models, see
supra text accompanying notes 64-78.
190 In its 1977 report to the Board of Governors, the Task Force asserted
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Once states adopted either Proposal A or B, they interpreted
the regulations narrowly, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court
consistently finding that states' regulations violated attorneys'
First Amendment rights.' 9 ' As of 1980, regulations in twenty-six
states could have restricted the ad in Bates,'92 as might the current
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. For example,
the Model Rules prohibit advertising that "compares the lawyer's
services with other lawyers' services."' 93 Bates's statement that
his services were "very reasonable"' 94 could subject him to sanc-
tions under the Model Rules by comparing the reasonableness of
his rates with those of other lawyers.' 95
States have used consistent excuses to restrict the flow of attor-
ney information to consumers, as evidenced by their defenses to
relaxing restrictions on attorney advertising in Supreme Court
cases. Many of their excuses are based on the assumption that the
unique qualities of the profession elevate lawyers above other
commercial practices. State bars have claimed that advertising
tarnishes the image of lawyers and has an adverse effect on pro-
fessionalism.' 96 As a result, several states rule that lawyers'
advertisements must be "dignified."' 97 State bars have argued
that attorney advertising is inherently misleading; attorney serv-
that it solicited the comments of consumers. See TASK FORCE ON LAWYER
ADVERTISING, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1977) in ANDREWS,
supra note 7, at 91. However, apparently no consumers actually served on
the Task Force. See id.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 139-55 (discussion of R.M.J.,
Zauderer, and Peel).
192 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 43. Although Andrews does not explain
precisely how the ad would be prohibited, one apparent reason would be
that many states continue to prohibit the use of illustrations in advertising.
See, e.g., infra note 203 and accompanying text (indicating that Florida bans
the use of illustrations in attorney advertising).
193 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1990).
194 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 354 (1977).
195 Although it would obviously be unwise for a state to prohibit
precisely the same ad as the Court allowed in Bates, the fact that existing
regulations could prohibit the very same ad indicates the reluctance of states
to expand information available.
196 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-48 (1985); Andrews, supra note 1, at 1012;
Hazard et al., supra note 32, at 1088.
197 For examples of states requiring dignified ads, see Moss, supra note
44, at 642 n.233. See also Andrews, supra note 1, at 1010 n.199.
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ices are too individualized to permit advertising.'98 They have
asserted that advertising will stir up litigation, raise consumer
costs, and lower the quality of lawyers' services.' 99 They have
complained that legal advertising regulations are too difficult to
enforce. 200 At times, they have not even provided specific rea-
sons for their decisions to prohibit attorneys' advertisements.2 °'
Despite the Court's encouragement of state bars to disclose
information, as well as the benefits to the profession disclosure
provides,20 2 states remain reluctant. Most recently, the Florida
Supreme Court approved the state bar's proposal to ban illustra-
tions, self-laudatory statements, and testimonials, and to require
disclaimers in lawyers' advertisements. 20 3 The next section sug-
gests that states' motivation to prevent public access to attorney
information runs deeper than the excuses they have provided.
2. Reasons for States' Reluctance
Although state bars may actually fear that advertising might tar-
nish the image of lawyers, more realistic reasons for withholding
information are tied to the profession's need to maintain its
autonomy through self-regulation. Only by maintaining auton-
omy can the controlling leaders of the bar stave off price competi-
tion and further federal regulation. Public ignorance of the
practices of lawyers helps maintain that autonomy.
Authors Geoffrey Hazard, Russell Pearce, and Jeffrey Stempel
198 See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S.
Ct. 2281, 2286 (1990); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644; Bates, 433 U.S. at 372;
Andrews, supra note 1, at 1012 n.207; Hazard et al., supra note 32, at 1088.
199 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642-43; Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-78; Hazard et
al., supra note 32, at 1088, 1091 n.25; Calvani et al., supra note 33, at 775
n.85.
200 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644; Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
201 The Supreme Court criticized the lower court in R.M.J. for its silent
record: "But the court did not explain the reasons for its decision, nor did it
state whether it found appellant to have violated each of the charges lodged
against him or only some of them." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 198 (1981).
202 See supra text accompanying notes 22-41 (discussing benefits of
disclosure).
203 See Clay Hathorn, Florida Restricts Lawyer Ads, A.B.A.J., March 1991, at
22. The Arizona Supreme Court is currently reviewing a petition by the
Arizona State Bar -calling for more severe restrictions on attorney's
advertisements. Included in the petition are restraints on publication of fee
information, comparisons of services, and publication of attorneys'
specializations. See Terrance C. Mead, Writing the Law of Lawyer Advertising,
23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 191, 192 (1991).
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assert that the profession's resistance to advertising stems from
its fear of price competition from other attorneys.2 °4 Using a
market analysis, the authors argue that the restrictions are a result
of competition among groups of attorney practitioners. The bar
has been dominated by attorneys who provide more individual-
ized, rather than standardized, services. 20 5 It is these individual-
ized-service attorneys who benefit least from advertising, while
the standardized-service attorneys, including public interest
groups, benefit most.20 6 Thus, it is, in part, the political and eco-
nomic domination of the bar by individualized-service attor-
neys 207 that encourages restrictions on attorney information. 20
The authors' theory is supported by the fact that it is lawyers,
not consumers, who complain of advertising violations by other
lawyers.20 9 It is also supported by the concerns of the Supreme
Court in Virginia Pharmacy that states' restraints on price competi-
tion would support pharmacists' monopoly. Responding to the
Board of Pharmacy's fear that advertising would allow consumers
to choose the "low-cost, low-quality service and drive the 'profes-
sional' pharmacist out of business, 2 10 the Court stated, "The
only effect the advertising ban has on him is to insulate him from
price competition and to open the way for him to make a substan-
tial, and perhaps even excessive, profit in addition to providing an
inferior service. ' 211 No doubt certain attorneys with individual-
ized services would also enjoy insulation from price competition.
A common thread to the excuses of bar associations and the
market analysis of Hazard, Pearce, and Stempel is the bar associa-
tions' concern that disclosure of certain information might under-
mine the economic and professional singular status of lawyers,
resulting in the profession's loss of autonomy to public con-
trol.2 12 State bars may likely fear that disclosure might reveal cer-
tain flaws within the profession, as well as the fact that lawyers
204 See Hazard et al., supra note 32.
205 Id. at 1110-12.
206 Id.
207 Id.; see also Andrews, supra note 1, at 1003 ("It would seem that
prohibiting lawyers from advertising hourly rates is designed less to protect
the public than to protect nonadvertising lawyers from competition.").
208 Hazard et al., supra note 32, at 1112.
209 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
210 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1975).
211 Id.
212 Indicative of the profession's desire to remain self-regulating is the
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may not be unique. Once lawyers are no longer viewed as
unique, the need for self-regulation evaporates, particularly
where self-regulation has failed to address the flaws within the
profession. 13
It is the appearance of self-regulation that allows attorneys to
maintain their autonomy from external control. 214 Self-regulation
is imperative for lawyers to continue their more covert practices,
such as prohibiting smaller firms and legal clinics from compet-
ing,2 15 lying to clients,2 16 keeping malpractice sanctions from the
public,2" 7 or refusing to blow the whistle on other lawyers.218
Allowing the public greater access to information about what
prices lawyers charge, how quickly they respond to phone calls,
ABA Commission on Professionalism's self-serving definition of
"profession":
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following
assumptions:
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and
the use of complex judgments.
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of
the service, they must trust those they consult.
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's
self-interest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the
client's interest and the public good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in such
a way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are
competent, do not violate their client's trust and transcend their
own self-interest.
" In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Profes-
sionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 261-62 (1986) (emphasis added), quoted in Spaeth,
supra note 37, at 1212.
213 A recent survey by the ABA indicates that 62.9% of lawyers polled
believe that lawyers are not doing an adequate job of policing lawyer
misconduct. A.B.A.J., May 1991, at 40.
214 Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for
Lawyer Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 31, 33. In support of his
statement, Powell quotes WJ. Goode, Community Within a Community: The
Professions, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 194 (1951): "[T]he social control of the
professional community over its members may be seen as a response to the
threat of the larger lay society to control it." Id. at 198.
215 See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
216 For an excellent expos6 of the various ways lawyers lie to clients, see
Lerman, supra note 115.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
218 See generally sources cited supra note 125 (discussing "whistle blowing"
by the judiciary and the bar).
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how often they settle cases, and how competent they are might
expose flaws in the profession that lawyers would prefer the pub-
lic not to see.219 As the Supreme Court stated in Virginia Phar-
macy, the free flow of commercial information is "indispensable to
the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [a free enterprise]
system ought to be regulated or altered. 220
Unfortunately, the desire of state bars to maintain their auton-
omy overshadows the need of consumers, such as Jessie, to find a
suitable attorney. Although the Supreme Court has expressed
sympathy for consumers like Jessie, it, too, has been overly con-
cerned with ensuring that attorneys maintain their unique status
among professionals through regulatory control. Moreover, the
tension created by the competing concerns of the state bars for
autonomy and the Court for regulation can only exacerbate the
legal profession's failure to address consumers' concerns.
The only way for the public to gain access to the type of infor-
mation it needs to make informed decisions in choosing a lawyer
is to restructure the way the legal profession views the problem.
Unless lawyers abandon their need to control information about
themselves-a need the Court expresses by promoting regulation
and the state bars express by promoting autonomy-they will be
unable to see the problem as consumers see it. Only if lawyers
begin to approach the issue as addressing the needs of consumers
instead of their own needs will the problem of finding a suitable
attorney be alleviated.
IV. WHAT THE LEGAL PROFESSION SHOULD Do ABOUT IT
It has been over a decade since Bates was decided. During that
time, the legal profession has resisted, rather than promoted, the
219 Finding inoperative disciplinary committees in several jurisdictions,
the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
warned the legal profession to rectify the situation, or "the public soon will
insist on taking matters into its own hands." ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 2 (1970), quoted in
Powell, supra note 214, at 40.
220 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1975); see also In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640,
648 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he information of what
lawyers charge ... is also helpful, perhaps indispensable, to the formation
of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system is
working and whether it should be regulated or even altered."), quoted in
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 358 (1977).
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Supreme Court's philosophy that " 'people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed.' ",221 As
a result, consumers such as Jessie still lack the information they
need to choose an attorney.
Although suggestions for providing consumers with more
information have been proposed, they do not address the con-
sumer's need from a consumer's view. Instead, the proposals
focus on appropriate regulation to safeguard attorneys' rights and
only exacerbate the problem of the foxes guarding the hen house.
Suggestions have been made that advertisements be analyzed
more broadly in terms of constitutional safeguards of attorneys'
First Amendment rights, rather than the more narrow terms of
detailed state regulation. 222 Requiring disclaimers in all attorney
advertising has also been proposed and adopted in some
states.223 Other commentators have suggested stricter regula-
tions2 24 and more explicit guidelines 225 for attorney advertise-
ments, with state bars taking a more active role in ensuring
compliance with established regulations. 226 Increased discipline
for attorneys who violate advertising regulations has also been
advocated.227
Other commentators have lent more support to the consumers'
point of view. A generalized market regulation of lawyer advertis-
221 Bates, 433 U.S. at 365 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
222 See Moss, supra note 44, at 625-26; Andrews, supra note 1, at 1011-13
(suggesting that we apply the constitutional test of time, place, and manner
to methods of advertising, disregarding the actual content of the ad).
223 Andrews, supra note 1, at 997-1000; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
But see James R. Devine, Letting the Market Control Advertising by Lawyers: A
Suggested Remedy for the Misled Client, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 375 (1982)
(arguing that disclaimers may add to deceptive nature of the ad).
224 E.g., John T. Ballantine, Jr., After Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association" Much Remains Unresolved About the Allowable Limits of Restrictions on
Attorney Advertising, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 143-47 (1990) (favoring
increased regulation to prevent deception of consumers, based on illiteracy
of consumers and "special characteristics" of the legal profession).
225 E.g., Dorothy V. Kibler, Note, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules
Preventing Attorney Advertising and Solicitation: Consumer Loses with the Zauderer
Decision, 65 N.C. L. REV. 170, 171, 194 (criticizing the Supreme Court for its
ad hoc decisions and suggesting establishment of general guidelines to
promote wider array of attorney advertising).
226 E.g., Linda S. Ewald, Content Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: An Era of
Change, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 429, 500 (1990); Mead, supra note 203, at
230.
227 Devine, supra note 223, at 351-58.
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ing pursuant to the FTC Act and consumer laws has been pro-
posed. 228 This regulation would remove regulation of attorney
advertisements from the hands of state bar associations. Certain
authors advocate putting a public representative on lawyer disci-
pline committees, 229 educating consumers on the practice of
law, 23 0 redrafting the Model Rules so that they are less self-serv-
ing and illustrate the client's concerns,23 l and making more infor-
mation available to consumers regarding their rights. 23
2
These various proposals are a helpful beginning, but they do
not go far enough. Consumer education is certainly important,
but it must be offered in terms of what consumers want to know,
228 Lerman, supra note 115, at 699 (arguing that consumer protection
laws are more effective than disciplinary proceedings, simpler than
malpractice actions, and will keep lawyers more honest); Makar, supra note
75, at 1009, 1011 (false, misleading, and deceptive standard under FTC and
constitutional safeguards of time, place and manner restrictions provide
adequate protection); Andrews, supra note 1, at 1006; Kibler, supra note 225,
at 193 (if all else fails, consider abandoning self-regulation). But see Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available,
81 YALE LJ. 1181, 1197 (1972) (arguing that FTC standards must be raised
in establishing guidelines for legal advertisements, due to public's lack of
sophistication concerning legal services).
229 Powell, supra note 214, at 40 (explaining proposal by Chicago Council
of Lawyers to remove control of discipline from bar groups and ensure
public representation on disciplinary committees).
230 Darden et al, supra note 4, at 131 (citing BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY
OF LEGAL SERVICES 36 (1970)).
231 Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility require lawyers to represent their
clients competently, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1
(1990); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980),
nowhere in the Rules or the Code is the profession required to inform
clients of lawyers' level of competency. In fact, the Model Rules appear to
undercut any such requirement to inform by allowing lawyers to represent
clients "in emergencies," where outside consultation would be
"impractical," despite the fact that the lawyer "does not have the skill
ordinarily required." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1
cmt. (1990). The rule also permits lawyers to represent clients in matters in
which "the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable
preparation," id., as does the Code, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1980), yet neither mention the profession's duty to
inform clients as to any evidence of lack of competency in a particular field.
232 William H. Cunningham & Isabella C.M. Cunningham, Consumer
Protection: More Information or More Regulation?, J. MARKETING, Spring 1976, at
67.
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not in terms of what the legal profession thinks they ought to
know. Requiring attorney advertisements and conduct to be reg-
ulated by consumer protection laws rather than state bar regula-
tions would alleviate some of the problems caused by a self-
policing profession, but it is still too narrow in scope. The con-
sumer protection laws are designed, used, and interpreted by
attorneys, rather than consumers. Attorneys, not consumers, will
continue to promote litigation over disclosure of information,
only under a different set of regulations. Instead, the public
should design the process of releasing information about attor-
neys, determining how legal advertising should be regulated,
what information regarding the profession should be released,
and how attorneys should be disciplined.
One suggestion for a publicly-designed plan would be to estab-
lish state or community consumer commissions made up of
nonlawyers to review proposed advertisements by attorneys. 2 31
Rather than employing the negative legal prohibition of "false
and misleading," the commission could impose a more positive
inquiry at this initial stage as to whether or not the ad was "help-
ful to consumers." Decisions could be based upon immediate cir-
233 Although this procedure could be open to a constitutional challenge
under the theory that it is a prior restraint on attorney advertising,
commercial advertising has been held to be exempt from the prohibition on
prior restraint. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-91
(1948); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); E.F. Drew & Co.
v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969
(1957), cited in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24. In granting authority to states to
discern which advertisements are false, misleading, or deceptive, the Court
has stated, "Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech, may make . . . inapplicable the prohibition against
prior restraints." Id. at 772 n.24. In Central Hudson, the Court even
suggested the previewing of advertising campaigns to ensure adherence to
the state's conservation policy. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980). It is arguable that if
the Court is willing to forego the prohibition against prior restraints to
facilitate states' burden to discern truthful from deceptive advertising or to
ensure adherence to a conservation policy, it should also be willing to
forego the prohibition so that consumers may discern which advertisements
might be helpful to them. Moreover, the actual screening process proposed
would have little effect in actually prohibiting advertisements, as most
advertising would most likely be found to be helpful in some way. Where
the process would be effective is in encouraging the legal profession to
consider foremost consumers' needs, as well as to encourage the public's
involvement in determining the information it receives.
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cumstance, rather than legal precedent. The commission could
set general guidelines, if it wished, about types of information
helpful to consumers, including information regarding the quality
of attorneys' services. This approach of initial screening by con-
sumer commissions involves trusting consumers reading the ad to
discern for themselves what type of information would be helpful
in seeking an attorney and trusting attorneys not to deliberately
deceive the public.234
Once an advertisement is published, it might still be subjected
to a "false and misleading" standard, but such a standard should
be set and adjudicated by consumers, not attorneys, and perhaps
weighed against the helpfulness of the ad in dispensing informa-
tion to consumers. The result would be to lower the standard
from what a "reasonable attorney" might advertise to a more con-
sumer-oriented standard of whether the public would think the ad
is false or misleading. 235 Such a standard would also subject law-
yers to the financial sanctions of punitive damages, attorney fees,
and court costs, which are not covered under many malpractice
insurance policies. 236 With more risk of financial liability, lawyers
are less likely to promote themselves in a false or deceptive man-
ner.23 ' Even more significantly, the use of a consumer standard
by consumer commissions would shift the focus of courts and
bars from how to regulate attorney conduct to whether or not
consumers' needs have been met.
To reinforce such focus, perhaps only consumers, not attor-
neys, should be permitted standing to bring actions complaining
of attorney information published. Once a consumer brings a
complaint, the attorney's conduct should be judged by public
juries, not by a judge or the practicing bar. All malpractice ver-
234 As the Court stated in Bates, "It is at least somewhat incongruous for
the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal
profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize
the opportunity to mislead and distort." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 379 (1977).
235 See Devine, supra note 223, at 370-71 (advocating use of consumer
protection acts to regulate attorneys' conduct, rather than bar association
disciplinary codes). Although I agree with Devine's overall proposal to shift
to a more subjective standard of review, I disagree with his rationale, which
is based on public naivete. Id. at 371. Instead, I believe the standard should
change because it is more appropriate to public needs.
236 Id. at 377.
237 Id. at 377-78.
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dicts and settlements should be published and records kept for
easy access by consumers.
In conjunction with abandoning lawyer regulation of the con-
tent of information dispersed and lawyer-administered sanctions
for misconduct, the legal profession must do its utmost to edu-
cate consumers on what they should expect from an attorney.
238
The more we demystify the practice of law by informing consum-
ers, the more able consumers will be to evaluate attorney services.
Corporate clients have learned that they can "shop" for attor-
neys.23 9 It is time the general public became aware of this as well.
But consumer education must be developed in terms of what the
public wants to know.
To promote public knowledge of attorney practices, existing
mechanisms could be enhanced. The legal profession, working
with the public, should continue to promulgate literature and
conduct seminars on the practice of law. Bar associations could
distribute free directories of attorneys and their areas of practice.
Lawyer certification programs could be improved, so that directo-
ries and referral services could be made more explicit as to attor-
neys' fields of expertise. 240 The directories and referral lists
could be updated more regularly, supplementing their current
contents with lists of attorneys having disciplinary actions pend-
ing. Other states besides Florida and Oregon should abolish
their "gag" rules. Referral services ought to work toward supply-
ing all consumers with computerized match-ups of attorneys to fit
their needs. The referral services should mandate consumer eval-
uations of attorneys referred and make them available to mem-
bers of the public seeking attorney services. A hotline number
with information available about attorneys' areas of practice and
238 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 375 ("If the naivete of the public will cause
advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role to assure
that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising
in its proper perspective.").
Some states have begun this process. For instance, the Beverly Hills Bar
Association has initiated a Citizens Law School, which educates the public
on the practice of law. See B.J. Palermo, L.A. 's Lay Law School, CAL. LAW.,
April 1991, at 24. The State Bar of California also publishes a series of
Consumer Rights pamphlets, one of which is entitled How Can I Find and
Hire the Right Lawyer?.
239 Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 54
(1988).
240 Thomas F. Gibbons, The Right to Specialize, A.B.A.J., May 1990, at 57,
59.
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malpractice or disciplinary actions pending should be made avail-
able to all consumers looking for lawyers. Finally, consumers
themselves should decide what other types of information, such
as years of practice in a specific field, they would like to have
printed in directories or made available by telephone.
CONCLUSION
A critical factor in all the suggestions above is precisely that
they are only suggestions, by someone who readily admits to
holding a narrow legal perspective. Better yet, the suggestions
and ultimate decisions should come from consumers dictating
what they want and how the legal profession could reasonably
meet their needs. For this to happen, attorneys must begin to
look upon the practice of law as serving the client, not the legal
profession. This entails reconsidering from a client's perspective
the rules lawyers have established to govern their own proce-
dures. The legal profession must encourage, rather than quell,
consumer confrontation with its practices. Only if lawyers relin-
quish to the public the task of creating and interpreting standards
by which to judge their own conduct can they re-establish their
dignity as a profession.
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